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Introduction1 
The 2010 floods in Pakistan triggered concerns 
about the potentially grave impact of global warm-
ing in countries with limited capacity to adminis-
ter effective disaster governace. International data 
reveal that »the number of disasters occurring due 
to hydrological and meteorological hazards has 
increased nearly five times in the last 40 years« 
(Asthana 2014: 17), an era in which human beings’ 
impact on the environment has come under in-
creasing scrutiny. Climate change is a particularly 
sobering prospect in Asia, a region that combines 
dense populations and ambitious hydrology with 
lamen table governance (Pommeranz 2009). South 
Asia, by all accounts, is likely to be hit harder than 
anywhere due to its high levels of poverty and in-
stitutional weakness (AFP 2010; Khan 2011; Bha-
tiya 2014). Pakistan has been highlighted in Climate 
Asia, the largest Asian study on perceptions of cli-
mate change to date, as having a particularly pre-
carious future. Having surveyed 4,000 people from 
that country, researchers found that it
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at The Quo-
tidian Anthropocene: Reconfiguring Environments in Urbaniz-
ing Asia, National University of Singapore, Asia Research In-
stitute, October 15-18, 2014; the author would like to thank 
the organizers and participants for their comments. I am 
also grateful to Asad Farooq (LUMS) and friends at Hirraq 
Foundation in Kotadu whose support networks, video archives 
and wisdom based on years of activism in the Saraiki belt of 
southern Punjab was generously shared at important points 
during the research process. The shocking murder of Zaffar 
Lund days before this paper’s publication is indicative of the 
difficult circumstances under which they work. Thanks also 
to research assistant Faheem Ameen and LUMS students 
who helped with translation of the Saraiki interviews; and to 
colleagues at ZMO (especially Katharina Lange and Katrin 
Bromber) whose feedback on an earlier draft of this paper has 
been extremely useful. (Errors of fact or opinion are my own). 
stood out from the other countries included in 
the study – India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Indonesia, 
Vietnam and China – because of [a] strong sense 
of despair. It was the only country of all seven 
in which more people thought life had become 
worse in the past five years, both in rural areas 
and big cities... In more than any other coun-
try surveyed in the region, people in Pakistan 
thought these changes in weather and in avail-
ability of water, food, electricity and fuel, were 
currently having a high impact on their lives, 
their lifestyles and health... (Colom 2014).
The phrase »both rural areas and big cities« is 
indicative of a certain binary thinking with respect 
to urban/rural settings that tends to underpin 
much research on Pakistan – a binary this paper 
seeks to problematize (see next section). Nonethe-
less, the survey is revealing of the acute practical 
issues and problems that face flood affected pop-
ulations in the aftermath of disasters such as the 
Indus deluge of 2010; problems that centre around 
access to basic resources. Policymaking circles are 
increasingly cogniscant of the role that cities play 
in addressing these difficulties. To a large extent, 
local bureaucracy and municipal authority consti-
tute the primary interface between flood-affected 
populations and humanitarian aid at the national 
and international level. Their importance in re-
sponding and adapting to disasters is crucial; they 
will play a considerable part in deciding the fates 
of many millions of flood affectees in the coming 
decades, a fact policymakers have begun to rec-
og nize. »Climate change will place an even higher 
premium on municipal capacity and management 
stuctures«, according to a report published by 
the World Bank, which points out that »cities are 
first responders in a crisis; they are the first to 
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experience trends« and constitute »the key agen-
cy to implement national government directives.« 
»National governments may set the rules of the 
game«, it analogizes, »but it is cities that are the 
athletes«  (World Bank 2010: 10, 14). Another study 
published by the Brookings Institution comparing 
the 2010 floods in Pakistan and Haiti earthquake 
is unequivocal: »Disasters will become an increas-
ingly urban phenomena« (Ferris 2010: 7).
This paper explores the role of cities in disaster- 
response, focussing on the short and medium term 
experience of displaced peasants who migrate 
to urban areas at times of environmental crisis 
and their impact upon the city itself. Beginning 
with a thematic sketch of two separate bodies of 
academic literature relating to disasters and cit-
ies respectively, the following section highlights 
under researched points of intersection deemed 
significant to the evolving challenges presented by 
climate change and urbanization. The paper con-
cludes by exploring lines of inquiry that go beyond 
the urban-rural dualisms and hierarchies that once 
dominated social theory and academic research. 
These, I argue, must address the new geo graphies 
of urbanization if scholarly inquiry is to inform di-
sas ter governance in the Anthropocene – an era in 
which disaster will be anything but exceptional. 
Disaster and urban Pakistan: a review of the 
literature
Literary accounts of death, injury and destruction 
caused by abrupt environmental change date back 
to the Babylonian flood myth; as such, they are as 
old as civilization itself. Rousseau is said to have 
offered the first social scientific insights into di-
saster when he identified human factors such as 
population density and slow emergency response as 
having compounded the impact of the Lisbon earth-
quake of 1755. Modern academic study of disas ter 
– that is, systematic analysis of causes and impacts 
– is a relatively recent discipline estab lished with 
the Disaster Research Centre at the Ohio State Uni-
versity in the early 1960s. 
Mainstream research on disasters defines them 
as events, concentrated in space and time, which 
cause societies to undergo severe physical harm 
and/or social disruption (distinguishable from, 
say, car accidents, which kill many thousands of 
people over longer periods across the world). Its 
purpose is generally to inform policies that seek 
to prevent, mitigate and manage the realities of 
floods, earthquakes and various other sorts of 
catastrophic events states must contend with; key 
areas of study include risk assessment, prepared-
ness, hazard exposure, vulnerability, response 
and recovery (for a discussion see Lindell 2011). 
Scholars of a more critical bent tend to focus 
on the ways in which state policies that seek to 
remedy disasters can themselves cause harm or 
be implicated in perpetuating unequal relations 
of power, exploitation and environmental destruc-
tion. This is true even where interventions are os-
tensibly humanitarian or geared towards aiding 
affected populations. For instance, geographer 
Ken Hewitt’s (1997) analysis of the technocratic 
tendency of states to quarantine sites affected by 
disaster shows how institutionalized attempts to 
rescue and rehabilitate can alienate victim com-
munities through subjection to the cold, insensitive 
gaze of official expertise.2 A more radical strand 
of critique con siders the exploitation of disastrous 
circumstances by elites and corporations to estab-
lish or consolidate agendas unrelated to recovery. 
On the economy, Naomi Klein’s notion of »disaster 
capitalism« has been invoked to draw parallels be-
tween the aftermath of war and occurrences such 
as earthquakes and floods – moments at which 
the destruction of already neglected public infra-
structure create a sort of blank slate, the perfect 
conditions for »shock therapy«. Disaster capitalism 
is a »fast-forward version … of what ›free market‹ 
forces are doing to our societies even in the ab-
sence« of such circumstances (Klein 2007: 48; on 
Hurricane Katrina, see Adams et al. 2009). 
In similar vein, scholars inspired by radical 
political philosophy have begun to study disas-
ters as occasions to deepen and extend the statist 
bio political project of regulating life and death. 
Drawing on Foucault (1990 [1978]) and Agamben’s 
(1998, 2005) development of Carl Schmitt’s con-
ceptualization of sovereignty as the ability to de-
cide whose life matters coupled with the power to 
declare »states of exception« in which law can be 
suspended, Makley (2014), for instance, interprets 
China’s response to the 2008 Sichuan earthquake 
and riots in Tibet as a part of a singular, milita-
rized drive to establish sovereignty by reinforcing 
nationalist narratives based on unequal valuations 
of the right to life. Reid (2010) argues humani-
tarianism is an implicit form of evolutionary social 
engineering, with emergencies viewed as opportu-
nities to make populations governable and fit for 
liberal rule through »adaption«.3 
2 For an anthropo logi cal take, see Kim Fortun’s (2001) com-
plex study of environmental activism after the Bhopal gas 
leak. 
3 This is all in line with Agamben’s (1998: 12, 78) view that 
ostensibly apolitical humanitarian internationalism for se-
lected, »worthy« bodies at specific moments is complicit 
with, and legitimizes the nation-state’s claims to bio-power. 
Mbembe (2003) has characterized such power as the ba-
sis of an order in which entire regions once subjected to a 
»permanent state of exception« under colonialism now en-
compass populations forced into »death worlds«: »new and 
unique forms of social existence […] and conditions of life 
conferring upon them the status of living dead« (40). Though 
he refers primarily to warfare and has not written of human-
itarian relief extensively, »necropolitics« and »necrocapital-
ism« (Banerjee 2008) are emerging as fashion able frames 
with which to consider the plight of populations in the global 
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The propositions of these various classical, crit-
ical and radical approaches to disaster govern-
ance (or, in Foucauldian parlance, »governmen-
tality«) are examined in the empirical context of 
the 2010 floods below. What they share is a firm 
belief that disasters are neither natural, nor iso-
lated incidents. If the events that trigger them are 
concentrated in space and time, their political, 
economic, social and environmental causes and 
reverberations extend well beyond the immediacy 
of their occurrence. To this extent, a paradox lies 
at the heart of academic disaster studies: insist-
ence on locating catastrophic events within longer 
durées of time whilst insisting on their specificity 
and distinguishability from the everyday. In prac-
tice this means environmental disaster must be 
studied longitudinally since its causes and conse-
quences have much to do with »ongoing societal 
conditions«, »pre-existing risks and vulnerabili-
ties« (Hewitt 1997: 141-2); floods, for example, are 
not discrete happenings but moments at which ex-
tant social realities, power relations and resource 
struggles become particularly visible and acute. 
The first empirical section of this paper will ex-
plore the immediate aftermath of the 2010 floods 
as one such moment, exploring the resonance of 
the theories discussed above in making sense of 
the social and political scenarios that developed.   
A second line of discussion goes beyond the im-
mediate days and weeks of population displace-
ment following the 2010 floods, extending the span 
of discussion to encompass wider contexts of space 
as well as time. Although the »whereabouts and 
distributions« or »geographicalness« of disaster 
have to some extent been studied by disaster spe-
cialists (e.g. Hewitt 1997, 40-54), I venture beyond 
this tradition to consider how recent developments 
in the »spatial turn« might shape the study of cli-
mate change-induced flooding: how can studying 
the geo-spatial consequences of disaster through 
larger trajectories of population displacement con-
tribute to debates about space in the global South? 
Studies of Asia’s »urban transition« have already 
implicitly revealed much about the plight of popu-
lations dispersed by environmental change, with-
out isolating their experiences from wider migra-
tory flows. This body of work has shown unplanned 
urbanization is the outcome of agrarian »distress 
migration« (Roy 2002), rural »expulsions« (Sassen 
2014) and proletarianization caused by the Green 
Revolution of the 1960s (Davis 2006). Much of what 
has been established about slum living in these 
works applies equally to the sorts of eco-migrants 
discussed in this paper. Nonetheless, studying the 
lives of rural-urban migrants affected by specific, 
environmentally disastrous events has the poten-
South that bear the brunt of disaster. (»Let them drown« is 
the title of a recent essay by Naomi Klein, 2016).
tial to nuance what has arguably become an overly 
generalized portrait of relocation to the metropo-
lis in overviews such as Planet of the Slums (Davis 
2006). 
For one thing, it is rarely noted that most of 
those uprooted from rural settings do not neces-
sarily migrate to »megacities« such as Karachi or 
Mumbai, which have arguably received dispropor-
tionate attention. In their introduction to a recent-
ly published collection of essays on South Asian 
cities, the editors (Anjaria and MacFarlane 2011: 
9) note that most of the submissions they received 
were on Mumbai, Delhi and handful of other (pre-
dominantly Indian) large urban centres. Yet over 
half of all urban dwellers in the world live in cities 
with populations of less than 500,000 and 40-45 
percent in cities and towns of less than 100,000; in 
developing countries two thirds of urban residents 
live in places of less than 1 million people (Bell 
and Jayne 2009: 689, 691). These populations often 
slip through the cracks of social science research 
because they are rarely involved in documented 
economic activity and thus remain unknown in 
World Bank data and assessments (2003, 2010). 
Neglect also stems from the obvious practical fact 
that smaller cities are difficult to access from met-
ropolitan research centres. Kot Adu, where most 
of the research presented in this paper was con-
ducted, takes eight hours to reach by car from 
Lahore, a case in point. (Getting to London by air 
from the same starting point is quicker). 
Whatever the reasons, the result is a bias against 
the study of medium and smaller cities in urban 
studies and geography. This mimics the exclusion-
ary nature of policy in both India and Pakistan, 
where government investment benefits a handful 
of large cities at the expense of each country’s ur-
ban majority. Academic research is thus failing to 
draw attention to the overall picture of South Asian 
urbanization – one in which a few large cities with 
strong economic bases are able to raise resourc-
es for development, leaving out small and medium 
towns in which the currently pitiful state of basic 
amenities and public or private investment is likely 
to worsen. 
What exactly are these? For heuristic pur poses, 
the latter are taken in this paper to be urban settle-
ments with populations of between 100,000 and 
500,000 people, though as some commentators 
have pointed, such numerical definitions are not 
universally valid since relative sizes vary consider-
ably across regions (Bell and Jayne 2009: 691). It 
should go without saying, moreover, that a more 
holistic definition would weigh cities by their eco-
nomic and political influence as well as their popu-
lation size. 
Perhaps more important than the physical size 
of small cities is their intermediary role: the ways 
in which they articulate new configurations of 
urban/rural and multi-scalar (i.e. local, national, 
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regional, global) tension and interconnection. As 
will be seen in the paragraphs that follow, rescue 
and rehabilitation following disasters are defined 
by weeks and months of contact between rural 
populations and nearby urban settlements where 
the existence of municipal institutions creates an 
interface between local actors (police and bureau-
cracy), provincial and national government (poli-
ticians), the army (state) and international donor 
funding and humanitarian organizations. In the 
medium and longer-term aftermath of disasters, 
these urban agglomerations promise the enticing 
hope of urban living, evolving into sites of formal 
and informal re-settlement. As ever greater num-
bers migrate to small towns in search of access 
to resources and the pull of city life, experienc-
es of urban »marginality« become more prevalent 
(Sommers et al. 1999). This last term, with connota-
tions of residing at the socio-economic and spatial 
edges of a society, is a useful way of capturing the 
condition of itinerant rural-urban dwellers worst 
affected by climate change (hence its appearance 
in the title of this paper).  
Indeed, my principal concern in the second em-
pirical section of this paper is to understand how 
such groups are denied and seek to »access« re-
sources in the aftermath of a disaster – above all 
compensation, land and labour opportunities.4 
Discussion will simultaneously explore the ways in 
which they assert their urban presence, impacting 
small city life in unpredictable ways that occasion-
ally confound authority. Here, contemporary rural 
migration to cities of the global South can build 
usefully upon older discussions about the agency 
of marginal populations in urban contexts. The 
wageless millions of the semi-rural global South 
can be likened to Marx’s own admittedly scant 
ref erences to the »lumpen proletariat« during 
the French revolutionary period, famously devel-
oped by Fanon (2004 [1961]) in The Wretched of 
the Earth (for a discussion see Denning 2010). Like 
Marx and other observers of the un- and under-
employed, Fanon was struck by the »superfluous-
ness« in colonial shantytowns of these »jobless 
sub-humans«. Though aware they would likely 
be recruited by colonialism if not absorbed into 
resis tance, he was alive to their unruly potential, 
noting their potentially volatile presence and com-
paring them to a »pack of rats« knawing at the edi-
fice of colonial rule. Asef Bayat’s (2012) writings 
on the Arab world echo those of Fanon, and are 
4  »Access«, in political ecology, is defined usefully by Ri-
bot and Peluso (2003: 158) in political and economic terms, 
not just legal ones, as »the ability to derive benefits from 
things« not mere »right« (as implied by classical definitions 
of property. It is thus »akin to a bundle of powers«, evident 
as much in the power to mediate and/or deny others’ access). 
As will be seen, it is embedded in »structural and relational 
access mechanisms« – political and economic and cultural 
frames (164) that define the Pakistani post-colonial state.
especially useful in making sense of the everyday 
tussles between structure and agency that define 
the condition of urban inhabitants in Pakistan’s 
smaller cities, above all, his canny concept of the 
»inside-out city« predicated upon the observation 
that so many of the urban poor spend so much time 
outdoors. Compelled to earn livelihoods, subsist and 
sometimes sleep outdoors in public spaces, many 
lead »pavement lives«, an existence that creates 
potential for frequent confrontations with munici-
pal authority and public power. Such confronta-
tions stem less from organized protest and more 
from spontaneous outrage at denial of access to 
amenities, resources and urban space. (Hence 
Bayat’s term, »social non-movements«, which cap-
tures the dispersed and unorganized features of 
collective action in the Third World). 
The 2010 floods in Muzaffargarh district
In mid-to-late July of 2010, intense monsoon rain-
fall upland resulted in catastrophic flooding along 
the Indus, displacing 20 million people, devas-
tating crops, causing extensive damage to infra-
structure and resulting in the deaths of at least 
2,000 over a period of several months. In line with 
many local and national news reports on breaches, 
I have elsewhere problematized accounts of the 
floods as having been caused by heavy rainfall 
alone. Downstream in southern Punjab and Sindh 
in particular, the geography of inundation was 
shaped by local engineers, influential landlords, 
political powerbrokers and state functionaries 
whose decision-making about where to breach em-
bankments was guided by complex combinations 
of personal interest, questionable wisdom and 
ideological bias es that arguably prioritized infra-
structure over people (see Figure 1). This work-
ing paper – the first in a series based on the data 
set used here – is concerned with the impact of, 
and governmental responses to the floods rather 
than the question of causality. It must be borne 
in mind, however, that in southern Punjab’s Mu-
zaffargarh district, flood relief and response was 
administered by local bureaucracies and landed 
elites considered largely responsible for the de-
struction that had been wrought. Villages, hamlets 
and small towns affected were home to vast pop-
ulations who believe with some justification that 
their livelihoods and dwellings were sacrificed to 
protect illegally grown cash crops and engineer-
ing failures at Taunsa Barrage. The very fact of 
the flood striking their areas was in and of itself 
evidence of the state, landed and political elite’s 
callousness towards them (Ahmad 2015a, 2015b). 
5ZMO Working Papers 15 · A. Nobil Ahmad · Disaster government at the urban-rural interface · 2016
Prior to the floods, southern Punjab was known 
as a region in which patterns of land distribution 
are marked by the existence of inordinately large 
holdings and vastly unequal relations of power – a 
system of labour control and social relations of-
ten referred to (hyperbolically) as »feudalism«. 
More akin to neighboring Sindh than the much 
more modernized and equally distributed agri-
cultural plains of northern and central Punjab, 
southern Punjab is populated predominantly by 
a peasantry that identifies in large part as being 
ethnically Saraiki – a language distinct from the 
Punjabi spoken by generations of military officers 
and the Urdu spoken by mohajirs [migrants] from 
India around the time of Partition who have set-
tled in their midst. Districts such as Muzaffargarh 
and other parts of the Saraiki belt are part of what 
might be described as an internal frontier filled 
by generations of colonial and post-colonial set-
tler migrants from the North. These processes of 
settlement have marginalized Saraiki »sons of the 
soil«, reinforcing patterns of unequal landowner-
ship created by the allotment of grants during the 
British era. The consequences of floods – from the 
question of who got hit, to the administration of 
humanitarian aid to the dynamics of urban mar-
ginality following migration to small towns – were 
structured by these historic inequalities between 
large landowners with ties to the state (itself dom-
inated by Punjabi speakers) on the one hand, and 
on the other, the majority of the district’s landless 
and small holding Saraiki peasantry population, 
which has minimal connections to the central 
state and political elite (Ahmad 2015a). 
They were also shaped by the political and ad-
ministrative context. Civilian rule had relatively 
recently been restored following a lengthy dic-
tatorship by the Pakistani military under Gen-
eral Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008), with impor-
tant implications for the initially sluggish pace 
of response. Rehabilitation was coordinated by 
the quasi-civilian National Disaster Management 
Author ity (NDMA), whose core response was the 
»Watan [country] Card« scheme, by which affect-
ed households were to be issued a sum of 20,000 
Pakistani rupees [300 US dollars]. Unveiled as an 
innovative use of technology to lower transaction 
costs and enable the poor to spend aid as they 
saw fit, the Watan Card scheme was the princi-
ple means of distributing foreign (predominantly 
US) aid to flood affectees. Despite worsening re-
lations with Pakistan following the Raymond Da-
vis episode and Abbottabad raid involving Osama 
Bin Laden’s targeted assassination in 2011, the 
United States was still the largest donor, having 
doled out nearly a billion dollars that year (White 
2011). As such, the Watan Card can be seen as the 
means through which international humanitarian 
aid reached Pakistan’s remotest peasants. Other 
highly visible donors included Turkey, which has 
played an increasingly prominent role in the eco-
nomic development of Punjab under Nawaz Sharif’s 
Muslim League-Noon provincial government at 
the time – now additionally the national govern-
ment of Pakistan, led by Sharif as the nation’s in-
cumbent Prime Minister. At the micro-level, little 
is known about the impact of such aid, less still the 
manner in which it has shaped and reconfigured 
the sociological context of flood-affected regions 
such as Muzaffargarh. What follows is an account 
of the aftermath of the floods which show how the 
administration of aid was experienced by selected 
recipients over a period of several years based on 
qualitative interviews and ethnography. Far from 
exhaustive, this initial stab makes sense of a nar-
row section of data generated during field visits 
between 2010 and 2016. 
Urban encounters: aid and rehabilitation as 
governmentality 
In the early hours of August 3, 2010, several days 
after heavy monsoon rains caused the severest 
flooding in North West Pakistan for 80 years, the 
river Indus burst through an embankment on its 
left side in southern Punjab. Upstream of Taunsa 
Barrage, floodwaters surged eastwards across 
densely populated areas, engulfing villages but 
also the city of Kot Adu, where I arrived to con-
duct research and investigative news reporting 
some weeks after the floodwaters had receded. 
Around 400,000 acres of Muzaffargarh district 
was inundated; 1.5 million were displaced. Offi-
cial estimates claimed around 50 people died. (My 
own inquiries suggest the number who perished 
by drowning was in fact likely to be much high-
er since the bodies of many of those washed away 
were never found and likely never reported). 
Figure 1. Areas affected by the 2010 floods in Pakistan 
(source: BBC http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-
asia-10986220 accessed 9 July 2016) 
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As it ravaged the district with biblical force, 
sweeping away bridges, homes and livelihoods in 
its wake, »nature« discriminated. The inhabitants 
of Muzaffargarh City (located in the southern cen-
tre of the area mapped in Figure 2) were warned 
by announcements from the District Commis-
sioner’s Office about waters that never actually 
reached them. Ordered to evacuate, most fled in 
panic despite the fact that the floods stopped short 
of their homes, underlining a key marker of differ-
entiation between urban dwellers and rural folk: 
many villagers I spoke with reported receiving no 
such government warnings about the impending 
arrival of floodwaters prior to their hurried es-
capes from locations west of Muzaffargarh City, 
much closer to site of the breached embankment. 
Such bastis [settlements] were situated near the 
village Dera Din Punah, North of Kot Adu city (at 
the North Western corner of the area mapped in 
Figure 2, below). 
                                                                                                                                                      
                                                    
Frequent reference to accidents, deaths by 
drowning and corpse sightings among villagers 
from these areas undermined official estimates for 
the number of villagers killed by the flood. In some 
cases, individuals who fell prey to the floodwaters 
had opted to stay behind in order to protect land or 
property from being appropriated or stolen. In oth-
ers, lack of information and failure to evacuate ru-
ral populations directly resulted in fatalities. NGO 
worker Zulfiqar Lund painted a terri fy ing portrait 
of a ten-foot wall of water crashing into dwellings 
still occupied by families caught unawares near 
the river. The absence of any state or governmen-
tal presence in the narratives of displaced persons 
is a striking feature of all the testimonies gar-
nered from non-urban settings. In the rural exodus 
that preceded the arrival of flood waters, no one 
reported any help in being evacuated; tens of thou-
sands piled into vehicles, donkey carts and even 
traipsed on foot along roads with their livestock 
towards cities; many sold livestock to pay for their 
transport, doing so in desperation at inordinately 
low rates. Consequently, despite local government 
having had advanced warning that the floodwa-
ters were on their way, the initial experience of the 
2010 floods for much of Muzaffar garh District’s 
peasantry was one of complete abandonment. 
In the resulting vacuum of official responsibility, 
the rural masses were left to make their own way 
eastwards towards Muzaffargarh’s small towns 
and cities, some of which, such as Kot Adu were 
themselves partially or largely flooded; many 
found themselves subsequently displaced two or 
even three times as the flood waters continued to 
inundate an ever larger area of the district. Pat-
terns of movement were segmented along class 
and social lines: villagers with kinship ties in 
small towns were able to move into their relatives’ 
homes or adjacent premises and lands; those with-
out either settled on sand dunes at the margins 
of cities or along roads leading up to them, where 
they found relative safety and access to trucks or 
city adminis trations distributing aid and informa-
tion. Urban dwellers in small towns such as Mu-
zaffargarh City, evacuated but mostly spared from 
flooding, made their way to Multan if they had 
enough funds and/or connections there, it being 
the nearest metropolitan area. A minority stayed 
behind, including a courageous skeletal core of 
health care professionals who volunteered to help 
with the rescue and relief effort, despite being 
told to evacuate following the breach of Abbas em-
bankment. 
After three weeks or so, the displaced start-
ed returning to their homes, or what was left of 
them. By the time I reached the city of Kot Adu in 
early September with a small group of academics 
and journalists wanting to understand what had 
happened whilst distributing cash collected from 
concerned friends and relatives, a state of rela-
tive calm had returned in the city, flood waters 
having receded from there. Tents lined the main 
roads, however, and many former village dwell-
ers were still living in desperate conditions. With 
local economies devas tated and livelihoods on 
hold, their dependency on national and interna-
tional aid continued for the next two months. On 
the outskirts of urban settlements, a constellation 
of medical camps and food aid centres served as 
nodal points within a broader network of distri-
bution points linked to the international aid effort 
through convoys of trucks from the North. Flood 
affectees were finger printed and required to 
show ID documents, but appeared to be accessing 
basic rations and medicines without gross impedi-
ment or indignity. 
Figure 2. Muzaffargarh district: villages and small towns/
cities west of Muzaffargarh City inundated during the 2010 
floods (source: google maps)                      
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It did not take long before the process of appor-
tioning aid became politicized by local political 
powerbrokers. As the sense of apocalyptic emer-
gency in the immediate aftermath of the floods sub-
sided, MNAs (Members of the National Assembly), 
MPAs (Members of the Provincial Assembly) and 
their oppositions began to assert control, ensur-
ing wherever possible that aid should reach their 
constituencies as reward for loyalty. (And equally, 
that those who had voted for political rivals should 
not be helped). At least one of the food distribution 
centres I visited was located on the private lands 
of a former local politician who was effectively me-
diating international aid flows to shore up his own 
personal and local influence. According to flood 
affectees, NGO workers and local journalists, local 
»feudal« politician-landlords did not hesitate to em-
ploy coercive measures to obstruct aid reaching the 
needy if they saw it benefiting non-voters or even 
non-aligned groups, blocking the mobility and ac-
cess of aid trucks to all but their own vote banks, 
installing touts amidst aid workers to identi fy the 
»deserving« and employing the muscle of private 
goons (including some police constables) where 
this was deemed necessary for enforcement. 
After the government announced it would be 
awarding affectees Watan Cards, a new phase of 
more direct contact between rural populations 
and small city bureaucratic offices was initiated. 
Bringing thousands of flood affectees out of camps 
into urban areas where they interfaced directly 
with the Pakistani state, this phase of rehabil-
itation was largely unmediated by landlords and 
local politicians. The mode of identifying those 
in »genuine« need required that »flood victims«, 
as they came to be classified, present biometric 
national identity cards to prove their being from 
an affected mauza [village community], giving a 
new lease of electronic life to units of colonial ad-
ministration established under British rule. The 
imperative to get registered and prove one’s iden-
tity as an authentic »flood victim« impelled signifi-
cant numbers of the rural poor and a minority of 
urban dwellers who had either lost their ID cards 
in the chaos of the floods or had never previously 
made them to get registered. Rehabilitation thus 
expanded the panoptical reach of Pakistan’s offi-
cial gaze over swathes of its population that might 
otherwise have remained unknown. The fact that 
this model of humanitarian aid was rolled out in 
parallel with expanding military operations in the 
North West, which resulted in forced displace-
ment from zones of conflict such as Swat, is not 
irrelevant. After the initial phase of lethargy and 
minimalist involvement, disaster governance had 
arguably begun to take on a biopolitical dimension 
of the kind envisaged by Agamben’s critique of hu-
manitarianism. 
At the national and indeed international level, 
the Watan Card system was presented as success-
ful on the basis of the high numbers of cards dis-
pensed – hundreds of thousands in Muzaffargarh 
alone (White 2011; Kamal et al. 2012). At ground 
level, however, shortfalls in capacity were highly 
apparent, the pressure of numbers creating an ad-
ministrative nightmare for both affectees and the 
local National Database Registration Authority 
(NADRA) offices expected to register applicants. 
In the sheer chaos that ensued when the sms text 
messaging system of notification to successful ap-
plicants broke down (causing larger numbers to 
arrive at Watan Card centres than could possibly 
be processed), there was little to suggest clear- 
sighted implementation of an all-powerful state’s 
biopolitical agenda to control its citizenry. To any 
reasonable observer, this was a bureaucracy with 
limited scope to know its citizenry let alone con-
trol the entire population within its territorial re-
mit. Crude application of Agamben’s ideas to such 
a context threatens to accord more coherence, co-
ordi nation and power than states such as Pakistan 
can actually muster at the local level, particularly 
at moments of crisis. If these are now held to be 
ideal opportunities for implementing prior cynical 
agendas and driving through capitalist reform by 
Klein and other radical critics, it is important to 
bear in mind that states themselves are peopled at 
the lower levels by bureaucrats caught off guard 
by the same circumstances of rupture that have 
displaced communities. 
Nor do the central cores of states assert any-
thing like complete control over these lower levels 
of the bureaucracy and police, their primary inter-
face with the public. As with any kind of service 
delivery or dispensation of entitlements within a 
state connected to society through valves of pa-
tronage and clientelism, the Watan Card (and the 
chaos surrounding its distribution) created oppor-
tunities for graft among the bureaucracy and its 
agents, both accused of sifarish [nepotism] and 
taking bribes for fast-tracking claims to compen-
sation without reference to realities of urgent need 
that ought to have been deciding whose Watan 
Cards should be processed first. Entire segments 
of those in dire circumstances were meanwhile 
prevented or delayed from receiving their rightful 
entitlements. My own inquiries confirm what news 
reports (Bari 2011a, 2011b; Kalhoro 2010; Express 
Tribune 2010) were suggesting: a combination of 
administrative incapacity, political meddling and 
profiteering were severely hampering and distort-
ing the process of rehabilitation and compensation. 
This was not disaster capitalism, but opportunistic 
petty pilfering and enactment of class, caste and 
clan privilege – the sort that in any case defines 
everyday social struggles in Muzaffargarh.  
The experiential impact of all this in the city 
was patent in the frustration and anger of flood 
affectees desperately demanding their entitle-
ments. The cumulative pressure of queueing for 
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hours, days and nights outside administrative of-
fices in the pounding sun and sapping late sum-
mer humidity to prove their identities was clearly 
taking its toll, not least because this was just the 
first stage of the process (see Figure 3, below). To 
have a Watan Card made entailed waiting in-line 
again at an even larger series of queues at a lo-
cal technical college in which processing by local 
administrators was policed by riot police with la-
this [batons], and then, if successful, completing 
the last phase of the mission by joining the back 
of yet another snaking line at an ATM. Banks in 
small cities are few and far between, partly due 
to the limited savings of their customers and the 
considerable extent of the informal rural-urban 
economy that surrounds them. Consequently, cash 
machines I visited as far as the town of Laya to 
the North in October-November were constant-
ly surrounded by crowds and long messy lines of 
deflated workers and peasants waiting in line for 
their first installment of 20,000 rupees (a figure 
that was reduced to 19,500 after some bank work-
ers and bureaucrats took 500 rupee commissions 
for speeding up dispensation). For the elderly, this 
system seemed particularly cruel. For young men 
it led to anger that occasionally boiled over. (I 
witnessed the car windows of a bureaucrat being 
smashed by a man whose right to flood aid had 
just been denied). For women, especially widows 
and estranged wives, the process was complicated 
by a patriarchal system that attached any entitle-
ments to their late husbands and male relatives, 
underlining the ways in which the consequences of 
disaster are sharply gendered. In this respect, Pa-
kistan replicates general patterns, in which varie-
gated entitlement relations mean that even within 
families, the ability to cope is differentiated (Hew-
itt 1997: 148, 155-6).
Struggling to stay afloat amidst this un man-
age ably large ocean of demand, the bureaucracy 
closed itself off from the public in air-conditioned 
rooms behind police barricades. It was accused 
(with some justification) of being unaccountable to 
local people and in thrall to powers of distant po-
litical centres in Multan, Lahore and Islamabad. 
Visits from ministers, members of the national and 
provincial assemblies and foreign dignitaries were 
carefully stage-managed photo opportunities – per-
formance sites of the »obscene« and »grotesque« 
inequality that so often defines the unwritten con-
tract of rule between leaders and their subjects in 
former colonial societies (Mbembe 1992). There is 
arguably a »banality« about the bureaucratic vio-
lence involved in herding around, humiliating and 
finger printing vast, immiserated and destitute 
constellations of unshaven, dehydrated men in 
tattered rags, clutching bits of paper upon which 
their lives and deaths depend. (Even if, occasional-
ly, an unlucky individual is crushed in a stampede 
or beaten to death by a policeman’s truncheon). 
Largely invisible and undramatic, we might call its 
enactment »structural« (Farmer, 2004). 
In the aftermath of the floods, the ways in which 
public and private power were contested were at 
least as numerous as its forms. It would be churl-
ish to describe the self-immolation of Mohammed 
Akram, who torched himself outside Gilani’s home 
in protest at his plight as evidence of empowered 
resistance among the subaltern populations of 
southern Punjab (Associated Press 2010; Daily 
Tele graph 2010). Nonetheless, as a form of protest, 
it challenges Farmer’s somewhat pessimistic as-
sumption that anthropologies of the living neces-
sarily elide the question of what happens to those 
who die without telling their stories (2004: 307). 
Akram’s suicide was reported around the world 
through a syndicated news article, evidence of 
the sort of attention even the tiniest of individu-
al trajectories can command in an age of global 
news media. The mushrooming of satellite tele-
vision channels in Pakistan during recent years 
has reinforced the trend of crowds raising plac-
ards and chanting slogans, making public appeals 
to the nation and beyond from the unlikeliest of 
places, turning remote backwaters into points of 
multi-scalar dialogue.
The congregation of an otherwise disparate 
peasantry in congested urban settings turned 
bottlenecked nodal points along the aid network 
into sites of urban-rural friction. Filled with large 
numbers of displaced rural compensation-claim-
ants, towns like Kot Adu and Muzaffargarh City 
became sites of potential and actual confrontation 
between the peasantry and municipal authorities. 
Spontaneous protests were common among those 
denied or made to wait inordinately long for their 
Watan Cards. Outside Kot Adu technical college, 
I saw a hundred or so men complaining to a local 
journalist that their mauza was not being awarded 
Watan Cards despite having been severely affected. 
They grew animated when they saw my camera and 
began chanting slogans about the injustice of their 
plight. One man sent a message to the provincial 
government: »We request the Chief Minister Pun-
jab to include our names on the Watan Card list. If 
Figure 3. Queue outside NADRA office around two months 
after the floods
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our cards don’t issued us we will destroy the govern-
ment’s property and the government will be respon-
sible for the damages.« A separate protest resulted 
in the death of a man from Kot Adu, whose brother I 
interviewed. Shortly before he was taken ill and died 
in hospital, according to Allah Yaar, he had been 
beaten by riot police in Muzaffargarh City where he 
had gone, with other demonstrators, to implore visit-
ing Prime Minister Gilani for support in having their 
Watan Cards issued. Following his brother’s death 
(quite possibly from injuries sustained from their 
batons), Allah Yaar laid his brother’s corpse down 
and caused a road block outside the police station, a 
common mode of protest among the poor in Pakistan 
when police refuse, as they often do, to file an FIR 
(First Information Report) containing accusations 
against them. The power of this sort of unplanned 
collective action, which one sees frequently in Paki-
stan, is hard to measure, not least because much of 
the time protestors know their actions may not alter 
fundamental equations, but pursue them as a means 
of asserting the morality of their causes. One thing 
was beyond doubt: the biopolitical project of admin-
istering aid to the peasantry through government of-
fices in Kot Adu and Muzaffargarh City created a vol-
atile, »inside-out« situation of the sort Bayat (2012) 
alludes to in his work on social non-movements. 
Disaster and urbanisation
As might be expected, the pressure on medical 
and other services and facilities in (or co-ordinat-
ed from) urban areas was considerable in the days 
and weeks immediately after the floods. In Muzaf-
fargarh City, for instance, a government school and 
technical college of around 8 acres was used to 
house some 80,000 displaced persons; medical pro-
fessionals dealt with a crisis of infectious diseases 
unprecedented in scale. Equally significant was the 
impact on businesses and shops which underlined 
the extent to which rural-urban economic exchange 
is based on mutual dependency. Small city bazaars 
which normally provide services and goods rang-
ing from car rentals to agro-chemical fertilizers, 
to cloth, textiles and foodstuffs to residents of sur-
rounding villages were hit hard when demand from 
these sources was abruptly drowned by the floods. 
Mobility within the district’s internal markets was 
severely disrupted by damage to roads. As the pres-
sures of perilous scarcity receded, the distortions 
of a bizarre new aid economy of dependency took 
shape which, in the exaggerated terms of one inter-
viewee, created a »taste for mineral water among 
the livestock of people who had themselves never 
dreamed of drinking Nestlé’s products.« »How« he 
asked, »is a shopkeeper supposed to sell flour to 
people made accustomed to receiving it for free?«
Compounding the negative impact of this eco-
nomic slowdown for urban dwellers was the enor-
mous pressure on housing, which resulted in a 
sharp drop in availability of cheap rented accom-
modation. Over time, this problem has remained, 
suggesting, as one Nazim Baloch, an NGO work-
er based in the city said: »The floods increased 
awareness of the city among villagers,« who, hav-
ing spent periods of time with friends and rela-
tives in cities they had otherwise rarely visited, 
acquired a taste for the benefits of urban living. 
Even among those who resided in camps near 
roads and the outskirts of urban areas, proximi-
ty to nearby factories (i.e. employment opportuni-
ties), amenities and hospital services instilled an 
aspiration to build a life in the city, regardless of 
their survival needs. The legacy for Muzaffargarh, 
says Baloch, is that a sudden proliferation of katchi 
[informal] settlements have now spouted up in ar-
eas like Karimabad in its Northern outskirts – for-
merly government-owned land that has grown into 
a belt of semi-urban sprawl which connects the city 
to Muzaffargarh bypass (see Figures 4 and 5, be-
low). This is reflective of urban settlement during 
»normal« (as opposed to post-disaster) situations 
across the global South, much of which appears as 
»ribbons of development« or »belts« along high-
ways (Ali 2013: 61), often indicating desire for ac-
cess to industrial sites (i.e. employment opportuni-
ties) and other benefits associated with urban life 
(see also Baviskar 2002; Roy 2002). 
How ever, the earliest settlers in Karimabad were 
families displaced by severe flooding in the 1970s, 
a fact which suggests ecological changes might 
well shape urban geography in particular ways 
that invite further research. The elevated height of 
this particular stretch of government land, I was 
told by two interviewees, has always lent itself to 
settlement during floods. As has occurred across 
urban Pakistan and indeed the global South, over 
time such unplanned transformations of urban 
space have become largely irreversible, with in-
formal occupancy eventually formalized through 
processes of regularization. 
Figure 4. Map of Muzaffargarh City, bypass road to the 
North (source: google maps)
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The implications of this migration and perma-
nent settlement for the city’s original inhabi tants 
have been ambiguous; as new powerbrokers move 
in and establish voting constituencies in these 
areas through facilitating regularization, talk of 
new kabza [land mafia] groups suggests small 
and medium cities like Muzaffargarh emulate 
the well-documented patterns in larger metro-
politan equivalents, Karachi in Pakistan (like In-
dia’s Mumbai) being the dystopian archetype. 
An obvious status distinction remains between 
settle ments such as Karimabad on the peripheral 
outskirts of cities near factories and motorways, 
where livestock wander past newly built homes on 
the one hand, and on the other, longer settled core 
urban areas where businesses, shops, offices, ba-
zaars and motor traffic suggest different sorts of 
economic activity. It is no coincidence, of course, 
that flood affectees tend to reside at the spatial 
and social edges of small cities like Muzaffargarh; 
their aspirations to city life are constrained by 
certain realities of marginality. The very process 
of spontaneous urbanization in small cities and 
towns thus reflects and reproduces ongoing rela-
tions of domination between town and country. In 
Karimabad, as in informal settlements studied else-
where, amenities such as water and electricity are 
accessed through complicated informal dependent 
relationships predicated on political and patronage- 
based connections to private service providers. 
However, property ownership appeared rela-
tively secure compared to metropolitan contexts 
such as Islamabad and Karachi, where the threat 
of eviction and/or demolition is higher due to the 
desirability and high capital value of big city land. 
Migration and informal settlement to nearby small 
cities have thus produced relatively favourable 
outcomes for some of those displaced by the 2010 
floods, transforming their spatial geography in the 
process. Such transformations have the potential 
to create anxiety among local urban elites unac-
customed to living in close proximity with classes, 
castes and clans that have historically dwelled in 
the surrounding countryside. 
If this was not always obvious in Karimabad, 
where the presence of officialdom was limited, it 
was clearly evident in a housing colony for flood 
victims built with Turkish aid, run by the munici-
pal administration in Muzaffargarh City. Located 
at the western outskirts of the city near Basira 
village, flooded in 2010, the Turkish colony repre-
sents a curious example of at rehabilitation of a 
rural area – perhaps the clearest attempt at social 
engineering I encountered. Built by one of the Pun-
jab government’s favourite regional partners but 
opened once again by Yousuf Raza Gilani amidst 
much fanfare and publicity after long delays, the 
colony has effectively transformed a previously 
agricultural setting outside Muzaffargarh City 
into a concrete housing society of 1,200 homes. En-
closed by walls with its own schools and medical 
facilities, Ilama Iqbal colony is considered a privi-
lege to live in for those lucky enough to have been 
awarded homes as compensation for their losses in 
the 2010 floods (see Figure 6 below). 
The wait for keys has been long: individuals in 
the focus group I interviewed had received theirs 
in March 2014. They explained bitterly that the 
city administration has threatened any family 
that leaves the colony with eviction. (»They have a 
bag full of padlocks ready for anyone who leaves, 
they keep telling us«). This policy is supposedly 
intended to curb attempts by families and individ-
uals from renting out their homes or attempting 
to divide their lives between the city and coun-
try, where many of them earn their bread through 
agri cultural labour. Most lack employment, and 
wish to continue rearing livestock and farming in 
their villages, but the housing regime they have 
been forced to accept prevents them pursuing 
such livelihoods. Job opportunities in nearby fac-
tories, meanwhile, have reduced sharply follow-
ing recent power crises that led to closures, so 
those who work do so mostly as day labourers for 
200 rupees per day. The adda [pick-up point] from 
where they are recruited (8 km from their homes) 
is now so oversubscribed with surplus labour 
Figure 5. View of Karimabad from bypass road
Figure 6. Turkish housing colony
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they don’t know when they set off in the morning 
in search of work whether they will be able to af-
ford transport fare home. This bizarre existence 
at the margins of the city – neither urban nor rural 
– is maintained not by police but teachers, revenue 
officials, electrical power workers and other gov-
ernment employees tasked with spying on them 
to make sure they do not leave their homes in 
search of work. Listening to their complaints, it 
was hard not to wonder whether the barbed wire 
and security gates surrounding their homes were 
not in fact »protecting« outsiders from the dwell-
ers within rather than the other way around (see 
Figure 7). 
The reality of life in the Turkish housing colony 
has little to do with the abstract and ambitious 
project of social engineering envisaged by its plan-
ners, itself a curious utopia that somehow neglect-
ed to consider that its residents might need em-
ployment in addition to shelter. As with the earlier 
discussed biopolitical aspects of humanitarian aid 
trumped by local bureaucratic inertia and petty 
patronage, Turkey’s grand vision of modernizing 
peasant life through concrete and bricks has been 
subordinated to a pre-existing social structure 
based on longer term patterns of urban-rural in-
equality. The city – represented by a profession-
al class of teachers and doctors employed by the 
state in government schools and hospitals etc – is 
doing all it can to ensure the continued oppression 
of surrounding peasantries.  
Communication across scales, between the local 
and international, has been effectively prevented. 
Days before I had arrived at the camp-like com-
plex, seven workers installing gas pipes had been 
electrocuted to death by a high voltage power 
transmission line. The men, whose bodies had been 
fished out of a ditch they were digging outside the 
colony by the residents I interviewed, were report-
ed to have been »working round the clock« at the 
behest of a subcontractor before a visit by Turkey’s 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Mehmood 
2014). Yet another example, it seems, of govern-
ance driven by central governmental concerns for 
photo opportunities related to foreign investment 
trumping any sense of responsibility to local poor 
people in smaller cities. Residents of Ilama Iqbal 
were anxious about the city administration’s re-
peated insistence on installing electricity metres 
they cannot afford (see Figure 8, below). Taken to-
gether with bills they say are inordinately high, 
it isn’t hard to imagine residents of katchi settle-
ments like Karimabad, where electricity is not nec-
essarily metred, regarding themselves as better 
off than these »beneficiaries« of rehabilitation. 
Conclusion: a right to the (small) city? 
It is possible to argue that with the Watan Card 
scheme, the floods of 2010 were exploited to in-
corporate bodies and lives previously unknown to 
the state within data banks of knowledge about 
Muzaffargarh’s population. However, at the local 
level, the central state’s designs were often under-
mined by local powerbrokers and a lower bureau-
cracy that directly interacts with its rural popula-
tion of largely landless and smallholding peasants. 
The employment of biotechnology is a notable de-
velopment but ought not to be taken as conclusive 
evidence of a successful biopolitical project. There 
were few signs of a homogenous and coherent cen-
tralized state agenda to control life at the level of 
local governance. Lethargy, administrative inca-
pacity and old-fashioned graft limited prepared-
ness and distorted rehabilitation in the immediate 
aftermath of the 2010 floods, hardly evidence of a 
grand plan. This is not to suggest state »failure« 
to help the poor was innocent. Official indifference 
and governmental incapacity were experienced 
as forms of structural violence against popula-
tions that were not even warned the floodwaters 
were on their way, then forced to undergo humil-
iation and hardships for compensation. Moreover, 
there is ample evidence to suggest national and 
provisional governments were more concerned 
with foreign investment and donor funding than 
Figure 8. Residents of Turkish housing colony complaining 
about cost of installing electricity metres 
Figure 7. Barbed wire surrounding Turkish housing colony
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doggedly changing its circumstances through di-
versification of economic activities. 
Such slow, quiet forms of migratory agency 
have gone largely unnoticed since the 2010 floods. 
Criti cal theory has tended to describe rural-urban 
migrants to cities in references to the Third World 
unemployed using pessimistic and morbid terms 
– »surplus humanity«, »refuse« and »rats« con-
demned to survive in death worlds (Mbembe 2003). 
Whatever truth in such portraits of their suffering, 
their rebelliousness points to insistence on rights 
to the dignities they are denied within the current 
political framework of post-colonial governance 
in Pakistan. Initiated by moments of disaster that 
will become increasingly frequent in the Anthro-
pocene, such assertions of entitlement are likely to 
force their way into the national and international 
political foreground as climate change intensifies. 
If Pakistan’s experience of the 2010 floods is any 
indication, the struggle of the rural masses for a 
right to the (small) city will count among the most 
important of the 21st millennium.
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addressing the concerns of flood affected popula-
tions. Since its rise to power in the 2013 elections, 
Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N has pushed an aggressive 
neo-liberal growth strategy in Muzaffargarh. Fur-
ther research might explore the question of what 
kinds of rebuilding contracts were issued in the 
aftermath of the floods, to whom and for what pur-
pose? The question of disaster capitalism might 
thus be addressed more fully. 
By triggering migration to small cities in the af-
termath of the 2010 disaster, flooding has altered 
Muzaffargarh’s human and spatial geography, up-
setting rural-urban social and economic relations 
of power. The continued maintenance of social 
boundaries and hierarchies between populations 
classifiable as rural and urban is reflective in the 
marginality of peri-urban settlements like Karima-
bad. Moreover, these divisions are consciously up-
held by the bureaucracy charged with the task of 
administering rehabilitation projects. Municipal 
authority preserves urban privilege even whilst 
ostensibly incorporating chunks of the peasantry 
into the city. As the oppressive reality of life in the 
government’s Turkish housing colony makes clear, 
ostensibly humanitarian exercises in post-colonial 
governmentality that might appear to have used 
disaster to advance social engineering tend to be 
used by local elites for their own purposes. Ambigu-
ous at best, the granting of a home in a manner that 
simultaneously denies its occupants access to em-
ployment opportunities can be seen as domination 
through control over resources: households were 
offered ownership in a manner carefully calculat-
ed and policed to limit the bundle of powers that 
might otherwise accrue to them as propertied ur-
ban dwellers (Ribot and Peluso 2003). 
None of this should blind us to the ways in which 
Muzaffargarh’s downtrodden rural protagonists 
seize opportunities of their own when di saster 
strikes. In the weeks and months after the di sas-
ter, they asserted themselves noisily, banging on 
the doors of municipal administrations in cities 
turned »inside out« by their presence. When »na-
ture« strikes, they – the rural poor – are worst af-
fected, an injustice they comprehend; they have 
no qualms demanding various entitlements to re-
sources and spaces, and do so with vigour when 
the outside world is observing. So called »flood 
victims« – a term now firmly embedded in the pub-
lic discourse in Pakistan – are a potentially unruly 
presence in smaller cities following disasters.
 They have also altered the geography of Mu-
zaffargarh through migration. If this was initially 
forced, strategic re-location to contexts such as 
Karimabad followed; claims were thus staked on 
the city and its resources by the displaced. The 
resultant condition of urban marginality is not a 
state of permanent damnation. Despite the socio- 
spatial relationship of domination it reflects, it is 
also indicative of the fact that the peasantry is 
13ZMO Working Papers 15 · A. Nobil Ahmad · Disaster government at the urban-rural interface · 2016
Ferris, Elizabeth. 2010. Earthquakes and Floods: 
Comparing Haiti and Pakistan. The Brookings Insti-
tution. http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers 
/2010/08/26-earthquakes-floods-ferris (accessed 
10 July 2016).  
Foucault, Michel. 1990. [1978]. History of Sexuality 
(Volume I). New York: Vintage Books. 
Fortun, Kim. 2001. Advocacy after Bhopal. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.  
Hewitt, Kenneth. 1997. Regions of Risk: A Geographi-
cal Introduction to Disasters. Harlow: Addison Wes-
ley Longman. 
Kalhoro, M.B. 2010. »NADRA Facing Hurdles in IDP 
Registration«, Dawn, 11 September 2010. http://
www.dawn.com/news/562210/nadra-facing-hur-
dles-in-idp-registration (last accessed 11 October 
2014).
Kamal, Simi; Amir, Pervaiz; Mohtadullah, Khalid. 
2012. »Development of Integrated River Basin 
Management (IRBM) for Indus Basin, Pakistan«. 
World Wildlife Fund. https://www.wwfpak.org/pub-
lication/pdf/irbm_2013.pdf (accessed 11 July 2016). 
Khan, Rina Saeed. 2011. »Flooding and Drought 
Will Become the Norm«, The Friday Times.  http://
www.thefridaytimes.com/beta2/tft/article.php?is-
sue=20110930&page=2 (last accessed 10 October 
10 2014).
Klein, Naomi. 2007. »Disaster Capitalism«, Harper’s 
Magazine, October 2007, 47-58. 
Klein, Naomi. 2016. »Let Them Drown: The Violence 
of Othering in Warming World«, London Review 
of Books 38 (11), 1-14. http://www.lrb.co.uk/v38/
n11/naomi-klein/let-them-drown (accessed 10 July 
2016). 
Lindell, Michael K. 2011. »Disaster Studies«, Socio-
pedia.isa, 1-18.  
Makley, Charlene. 2014. »Spectacular Compassion: 
›Natural‹ Disasters and National Mourning in Chi-
na’s Tibet«, Critical Asian Studies 46 (3), 371-404. 
Mbembe, Achille. 1992. »Provisional Notes on the 
Post-colony«, Africa 62 (1), 3-37. 
Mbembe, Achille. 2003. »Necropolitics«, Public Cul-
ture 15 (1), 11-40.  
Mehmood, Khalid. 2014. »Seven Workers Electro-
cuted in Muzaffargarh«, The Nation, 15 June (last 
accessed 11 October 2014).
Pommeranz, Kenneth. 2009. »The Great Himaly-
an Watershed«, New Left Review 58, July-August. 
http://newleftreview.org/II/58/kenneth-pomer-
anz-the-great-himalayan-watershed (last accessed 
9 December 2014).   
Reid, Julian. 2010. »The Biopoliticization of Humani-
tarianism«, Journal of Intervention and State-
building 4 (4), 391-411.
Ribot, Jesse C.; Peluso, Nancy Lee. 2003. »A Theory 
of Access«, Rural Sociology 68 (2), 155-81. 
Roy, Ananya. 2002. City Requiem Calcutta. Minnea-
polis: University of Minnesota.
Asthana, Vinay. 2014. »Disaster Risk Management«, 
Economic and Political Weekly, 27 September 2014, 
Volume XLIX No. 39, 17-20. 
Banerjee, Subharata Bobby. 2008. »Necro capitalism«, 
Organization Studies 29 (12), 1541-1563.  
Bari, Sarwar. 2011a. »The Corrupt Politics of Floods 
and Watan Cards«, The News Saturday, 12 Feb-
ruary, 2011. http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-
News-6-30792-The-corrupt-politics-of-floods-and-
Watan-Cards (last accessed 11 October 2014).  
Bari, Sarwar. 2011b. »Who was Hit and Who Got 
the Reward?«, The News, 12 February 2011. http://
www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-3956-Who-
was-hit-and-who-got-the-reward (last accessed 11 
October 2014).  
Baviskar, Amita. 2002. »Between Violence and De-
sire: Space, Power, and Identity in the Making of 
Metropolitan Delhi«, Intenational Social Science 
Journal 175, 89-98.  
Bayat, Asef. 2012. »Politics in the City-Inside-Out«, 
City and Society 24 (2), 110-128.
Bhatiya, Neil. 2014. »Why is South Asia so Vul-
nerable to Climate Change?«, Foreign Policy 22, 
April 2014 http://southasia.foreignpolicy.com/
posts/2014/04/22/the_sobering_story_of_climate_
change_in_south_asia (last accessed 10 October 
2014). 
Bell, D.;  Jayne, M. 2009. »Small Cities? Towards a 
Research Agenda«, International Journal of Urban 
and Regional Research 33 (3), 683-699.
Bunnel, Tim; Parthasarathy, D.; Thompson, Eric C. 
2013. »Introduction«, in Tim Bunnel, D. Parthasar-
athy, Eric C. Thompson (eds.). Cleavage, Connec-
tion and Conflict in Rural, Urban and Contemporary 
Asia. Heidelberg, New York: Springer, 1-11.     
Colom, Anna. 2014. »Climate Change in Pakistan: In-
novation in the Absence of Government Support«, 
The Guardian, 21 May 2014 http://www.theguard-
ian.com/global-development-professionals-net-
work/2014/may/21/pakistan-climate-change-asia 
(last accessed 10 October 2014).
Daily Telegraph, Sydney. 2010. »Flood Victim Torches 
himself Outside Prime Minister’s House, 21 Septem-
ber 2010.  http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/paki-
stani-flood-victim-torches-himself-outside-prime-
ministers-house/story-e6freuyi-1225927047782 
(last acessed 7 July 2016). 
Davis, Mike. 2006. Planet of Slums. London: Verso.  
Denning, Michael. 2010. »Wageles Life«, New Left 
Review 66, November-December, 79-97. 
Express Tribune. 2010. »Watan Card Distribu-
tion Exposes Administrative Weakness«, 24 Sep-
tember 2010. http://tribune.com.pk/story/53903/
watan-card-distribution-exposes-administra-
tive-weakness (last accessed 11 October 2014).   
Farmer, Paul. 2004. »An Anthropology of Structural 
Violence«, Current Anthropology 45 (3), 305-9.  
Fanon, Frantz. 2004. [1961]. The Wretched of the 
Earth. England: Grove Press. 
14ZMO Working Papers 15 · A. Nobil Ahmad · Disaster government at the urban-rural interface · 2016
White_2010FloodDisasterPakistan.pdf (accessed 
11 July 2016).    
World Bank. 2003. Building Safer Cities: The Future 




cessed 28 September 2014). 
World Bank. 2010. Cities and Climate Change: An Ur-
gent Agenda. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTUWM/Resources/340232-1205330656272/Cit-
iesandClimateChange.pdf (last accessed 28 Sep-
tember 2014).  
Roy, Ananya. 2011. »Slumdog Cities: Rethinking 
Subaltern Urbanism«, International Journal of Ur-
ban and Regional Research 35 (2), 223-8.   
Sassen, Sakia. 2014. Expulsions. Harvard University 
Press.  
Sommers, Lawrence M.; Mehretu, A.; Pigozzi, Bruce 
W.M. 1999. »Towards Typologies of Socio-econom-
ic Marginality: North/South Comparisons«, in H. 
Jusilla, R. Majoral, C.C. Mutambirwa (eds.). Mar-
ginality in Space – Past, Present and Future: Theo-
retical and Methodological Aspects of Cultural, So-
cial and Economical Parameters of Marginal and 
Critical Regions, England: Ashgate, 7-24. 
White, Stacey. 2011. The 2010 Flooding Disaster in 
Pakistan. Centre for Strategic and Inter national 
Studies. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/
s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/110930_
Ali Nobil Ahmad is a historical sociologist working at ZMO 
on the research project »Violent Environments: Ideology 
and the Politics of Ecology in Pakistan’s Peripheries«. 
(Ali.NobilAhmad@zmo.de)
The ZMO Working Papers is a series of publications that document and reflect developments and discussions within 
ZMO research projects. Texts are usually empirically based and regionally focused and may also represent outcomes of 
research at an early stage. They are published on the ZMO website.
The Zentrum Moderner Orient (ZMO) is the only German research institute devoted to an interdisciplinary and compa-
rative study of the Middle East, Africa, South, Southeast and Central Asia from a historical perspective. Current research 
focuses on the interaction between predominantly Muslim societies and their relations with non-Muslim neighbours. ZMO 
was founded in 1996 as one of six university-independent, non-profit research centres for research in the humanities.
ISSN  2191-3897                                       
© ZMO 2016       
Design: Jörg Rückmann, Berlin
This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other purposes, 
whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). If cited or quoted, reference 
should be made to full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title of the  programmatic text, the year and the publisher.
For questions and comments please contact ZMO.
